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Chimpanzee Theory of Mind: Looking in All the Wrong Places?

KRISTIN ANDREWS
York University

ABSTRACT
I respond to an argument presented by Daniel Povinelli and Jennifer Vonk that the current generation of
experiments on chimpanzee theory of mind cannot decide whether chimpanzees have the ability to
reason about mental states. I argue that Povinelli and Vonk’s proposed experiment is subject to their own
criticisms and that there should be a more radical shift away from experiments that ask subjects to predict
behavior. Further, I argue that Povinelli and Vonk’s theoretical commitments should lead them to accept
this new approach, and that experiments which offer subjects the opportunity to look for explanations for
anomalous behavior should be explored.

1. Introduction
In a pair of recent papers, Daniel Povinelli and Jennifer Vonk (2003, 2004) offer a critique of the current
research paradigm being used to investigate chimpanzee theory of mind. Defining theory of mind as ‘the
ability to reason about mental states’ (2004, p. 1), Povinelli and Vonk (P&V) claim that there is no
evidence that chimpanzees reason about mental states such as seeing. Though recent research by
Michael Tomasello, Brian Hare, and Josep Call seems to suggest that chimpanzees can reason about
seeing, P&V argue that the paradigms presented in support of Tomasello et al.’s conclusion are not able
to distinguish between mentalistic and behavioristic psychological systems in chimpanzees. In their most
recent paper, P&V have introduced a novel paradigm which they believe could decide between the
competing hypotheses.
While P&V are right to suggest a worry with the current research paradigm on chimpanzee theory of
mind, I think that the arguments they present against Tomasello et al. are misplaced. Part of the problem
is that their novel paradigm is subject to the same criticisms they present against the old paradigm.
However, P&V hint at a different solution to the problem of developing research paradigms that will
distinguish between mentalistic and behavioristic explanations of chimpanzee behaviors which I take to
be much more promising. They think that chimpanzees as well as humans make predictions by appealing
to behavioral abstractions rather than using mentalistic reasoning regarding the beliefs and desires of the
target (though they think that humans use mentalistic reasoning to make some novel predictions). If
attribution of mental states does not play a significant role in most of our predictive behaviors, then
perhaps we ought not look for chimpanzee theory of mind using predictive paradigms. While the current
research paradigms of Tomasello et al., as well as P&V’s proposed paradigm, emphasize prediction, I will
argue that an explanatory experimental paradigm is what is needed for a genuine paradigm shift.
2. Background to the ‘Gentle Controversy’
After several years of growing agreement that chimpanzees do not understand mental states, Josep Call,
Brian Hare, and Michael Tomasello broke with consensus (Hare, Call, Agnetta, and Tomasello, 2000;
Hare, Call, and Tomasello, 2001; Call, 2001; Tomasello, Call and Hare, 2003a, 2003b). Tomasello et al.
(2003a) claim that chimpanzees seem to understand some things about what others do and do not see,

as well as some things about others’ goal-directed activities. Whether or not this counts as having a
theory of mind in the sense of attributing beliefs and desires, is seen as unimportant, for ‘the generic label
‘‘theory of mind’’ actually covers a wide range of processes of social cognition’ (Tomasello, Call, and
Hare, 2003b, p. 239).
To defend the claim that chimpanzees understand seeing as a mentalistic concept, they refer to the fact
that chimpanzees spontaneously monitor the gaze of conspecifics and they will move to follow human
gaze around barriers, into other rooms, etc. Further, when a human experimenter is gazing intently at
nothing, the chimpanzees will first follow the experimenter’s gaze, and then after seeing nothing
interesting to look at will turn to look back at the experimenter.
Their primary evidence, however, takes the form of a food competition study in which a subordinate and
dominant chimpanzee are both given access to a room which has been baited with food. The general
finding is that subordinates avoid the food that the dominant can see and seek out the food the dominant
cannot see. This ability to discriminate between identical items of food based on its property of visibility is
taken to indicate that the apes have a concept of seeing. This is a predictive paradigm, in that the
subordinate is given the task of predicting where the dominant will go to seek food, and given that
information the subordinate adjusts her own behavior accordingly. Call (2001) emphasizes the predictive
nature of the task, writing that ‘one important skill in both cooperative and competitive situations is the
ability to predict and anticipate the behavior of conspecifics’ (Call, 2001, p. 388). He believes that there
are two general classes of explanation for predictive behaviors generally—a purely behavioristic cuebased approach, and a knowledge-based approach in which apes construct and use categories of
behavior. The only difference between these two approaches is with regard to the ability of the animal to
use intervening variables—the abstract concepts that are used to organize behavior. As Call points out,
and as P&V confirm, there is ample evidence from studies on chimpanzee concepts (such as
same/different, stimulus equivalence, and transitivity tasks) that chimpanzees use categories to
determine the responses they should make. The real issue at stake is whether some of those categories
are psychological ones.
3. Povinelli and Vonk’s Critique
Povinelli and Vonk claim that the food competition study offers no evidence that chimpanzees use
mentalistic concepts when reasoning about behavior, because the performance of the chimpanzees can
be fully explained even if the chimps have no mentalistic understanding; they could simply be making
inferences based on past experience. To formulate this argument, P&V introduce two alternative
psychological systems that may account for the chimpanzee’s predictive ability. The first is limited to
reasoning about behavior, and the second adds the ability to reason about mental states. The nonmentalistic psychological system, which they call Sb, consists of:
1. a database of representations of both specific behaviors and statistical invariants which are
abstracted across multiple instances of specific behaviors; (representations that may be formed
either by direct experience with the world, or may be epigenetically canalized);
2. a network of statistical relationships that adhere between and among the specific behaviors and
invariants in the database;
3. an ability to use the statistical regularities to compute the likelihood of the specific future actions
of others (Povinelli and Vonk, 2004, p. 6).
The alternative to Sb is a theory of mind system, which P&V refer to as Sb+ms. It is described as Sb plus the
ability to reason about mental states. They don’t elaborate on what is involved in the ability to reason
about mental states. What they do say is that ‘it [the human theory of mind system] uses information

about ongoing, recent, or even quite temporally distant behaviors, to generate inferences about the likely
mental states of others’ (Povinelli and Vonk, 2004, p. 6). Thus, since the theory of mind part of the system
doesn’t make direct inferences about behavior, P&V say that it is essential that the mental state
reasoning system be built on top of the behavior reasoning system: ‘[M]aking inferences about mental
states does not allow an organism to skip the step of having to detect the abstract categories of behavior
and compute the regularities among them’ (Povinelli and Vonk, 2004, p. 7).
As best as I can understand the suggestion, P&V’s Sb+ms system works as follows:
1. Observe behavior, and categorize it.
2. Refer to the database to match the category of behavior and environmental features with another
behavior.
3. Infer the mental state associated with the behavior.
4. Use the ability to compute statistical regularities and the mental state attribution to make a
prediction of behavior.
At step (2) the subject either has enough information to infer the prediction from statistical regularities of
behavior, or it doesn’t. P&V don’t go into detail about how knowing the mental state would help to predict
behavior, and they also suggest that the mental states are sometimes only generated to ‘go along’
(Povinelli and Vonk, 2004, p. 9) with the predicted behavior. However, they do think that ‘it is possible to
imagine situations in which responding appropriately in relatively novel situations might be facilitated by a
system that reasons about mental states’ (Povinelli and Vonk, 2004, p. 10) and ‘it seems possible (even
likely) that an organism possessing an Sbþms wields certain predictive and explanatory abilities over and
above an organism possessing only an Sb’ (Povinelli and Vonk, 2004, p. 12).
These last remarks are very suggestive. While most theory of mind researchers have taken for granted a
robust predictive function for theory of mind, P&V are much more tentative in their claims. Rather than
saying that a theory of mind is used to predict behavior, full stop, they make the more nuanced claim that
a theory of mind may help in making some predictions in novel situations. This is a much weaker
predictive role than the one usually taken to be associated with theory of mind, and P&V have good
reason for accepting such a position. On their view, in most cases of prediction step (3) of Sb+ms will be
superfluous, not just for chimpanzees, but also for humans.
As a consequence, P&V argue that successful performance in any research paradigm that asks a
chimpanzee to make predictions of behavior in familiar situations will fail to serve as evidence for
mentalistic reasoning, since the behavior could have been predicted using behavioral abstractions and
inductive reasoning. Thus, they claim that the chimpanzees’ performance in the food competition
paradigm cannot establish the existence of mentalistic reasoning, since the subordinate has had ample
opportunity to observe other chimpanzees moving toward food after having engaged in some behavioral
invariant, such as turning a head toward the food. If the subordinate has knowledge of this behavioral
regularity, he doesn’t need any mentalistic knowledge in order to predict that a dominant who has turned
his head toward some food will next move toward the food. Whether he has any mentalistic knowledge is
another question. As P&V put it, ‘Techniques that pivot upon behavioral invariants (looking, gazing,
threatening, peering out the corner of the eye, accidentally spilling juice versus intentionally pouring it
out), will always presuppose that the chimpanzee (or other agent) has access to the invariant, thus
crippling any attempt to establish whether a mentalistic coding is also used’ (Povinelli and Vonk, 2003, p.
159). Thus they conclude that no experiment which relies on behavioral invariants will suffice to decide
between a mentalistic, as opposed to a merely behavioristic, psychological system. What is needed is a
paradigm where the chimpanzee must make a prediction in a novel situation, one for which he has no

behavioral abstractions. Povinelli and Vonk propose just such an experiment, which will be discussed in
section 6.
4. Prediction and Theory of Mind
P&V make two claims in their critique I would like to draw attention to. One claim is that Sb+ms is an
accurate account of the mentalistic psychological system. The other claim is that the attribution of mental
states facilitates predictions of behavior in novel conditions. These two claims are consistent with the
larger assumption that underlies much of the research on theory of mind, namely that prediction is the
primary function of theory of mind (Andrews, 2003). While P&V are right to say that the predictive power
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of mental state attribution has been exaggerated, they have not taken full advantage of this insight. This
is evident in their description of the behavoristic psychological system. Remember that the third
component of Sb is the ‘ability to use the statistical regularities to compute the likelihood of the specific
future actions of others’ (Povinelli and Vonk, 2004, p. 6). This is the only function presented in the
description of the psychological system, and while it tells us something about the system’s approach to
prediction, nothing follows about how the system would handle explanation of behaviors. Since Sbþms
only adds the ability to reason about mental states, the theory of mind psychology system they describe is
explicitly focused on the mechanisms underlying the prediction of behavior. This suggests that P&V
remain committed to the idea that mental state attribution plays a predictive role in humans, even if that
role has been overstated in the past. Thus, the problem they see with the current paradigm isn’t that it
emphasizes prediction. Rather, their problem is that the predictions subjects are asked to make are just
too easy.
What I would like to suggest in this section is that the traditional view that prediction is the primary
function of theory of mind is false. I will argue that the claim that humans predict behavior by attributing
mental states is exaggerated, and that other methods are likely to play a more fundamental role in
generating predictions. Further, I suggest another role for mental state attribution in humans; we attribute
beliefs, desires, and other mental states in order to generate explanations for behaviors. These
explanations may then lead to further predictions, but it is explanation that is the primary function of our
theory of mind.
Despite their remarks on the robust predictive power of Sb, P&V are among those who accept that one of
the purposes of a theory of mind is to ‘to successfully predict future behavior (and hence assist the
organism in determining what actions it should take)’ (Povinelli and Vonk, 2004, p. 7). Because of this,
and because of the structure of their theory of mind system, we can see similarities between P&V’s
account and the more traditional theory of mind account that is associated with the theory-theory and
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established philosophical approaches to folk psychology. The database and the rules of Sb can be seen
as part of the tacit theory that chimpanzees (and, with a different set of regularities, humans) use when
predicting familiar behavior. While some simulation theorists deny that the mechanisms that subsume
mentalistic reasoning rest upon a foundation of behavioral regularities, P&V simply assume that this
aspect of simulation theory is false.
However, P&V’s view differs from the theory-theory’s reliance on mental state attribution as necessary for
predicting behavior. While they think humans use theory of mind to make predictions in some situations,
they argue that most instances of prediction do not involve mentalistic reasoning. Though I think they are
right about this, the view is at odds with the bulk of the literature. The term ‘theory of mind’ was first
introduced by Premack and Woodruff, who were interested in whether the chimpanzees do what it is
assumed that we do, namely attribute beliefs and desires in order to facilitate the prediction of behavior
(Premack and Woodruff, 1978). According to Premack and Woodruff, humans use mental state attribution

instead of behavioral regularities to predict behavior. The attribution was thought to play a causal role in
formulating the prediction.
P&V reject Premack and Woodruff’s characterization of theory of mind, because they reject the
presupposition. That is, they reject the claim about what humans do. Adult humans do not typically
attribute mental states such as beliefs and desires in order to predict behavior, according to P&V. Instead
‘it seems likely that much human social interaction is supported solely by the features of Sb’ (Povinelli and
Vonk, 2004, p. 7).
However, there are reasons to reject both the traditional reliance on theory of mind for prediction and
P&V’s less substantial view of the predictive role of theory of mind. Research coming from both social
psychology and developmental psychology offers accounts of prediction which do not rely on mental state
attribution, and are not part of a system like Sb. And on some of these views, the change in predictive
skills in children between age three and four is not described in terms of the development of a theory of
mind. For example, Birch and Bloom argue that children don’t come to pass the false belief task because
they are suddenly given propositional knowledge about others’ mental states, but rather such changes
occur as children gain competence at overcoming their own epistemic biases (Birch and Bloom, 2004).
And while P&V cite Baird and Baldwin (2001) for their claim that human infants rely on a system such as
Sb when anticipating people’s actions, there is evidence that the methods we use to make predictions
involve not just Sb, or Sb+ms, but include a host of heuristics and biases now being uncovered by social
psychologists. One such technique is trait attribution.
Trait attribution is different from generalizing about behavioral regularities, since observation of behavior
is not necessary for the attribution of the trait. Some traits are attributed just by looking at a person’s skin
color, facial attributes, or dress. Other times we attribute traits to a person after hearing about that
person’s past behavior, or when others attribute that trait to her. For example, if I am told that the family I
will be dining with is very pious, I may predict that they will say a prayer before dinner, even though I have
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never dined with a religious family before. Trait attributions are a particularly common way of predicting
novel behavior. When interviewing candidates for a job, we tend to evaluate them in terms of their traits
(hard-working, creative, intelligent, a good speaker, etc.). The interviewers expect that a candidate with
the right traits will be a good teacher, for example, even when they don’t have any prior experience with
that individual in the classroom. Though this is a common method of predicting behavior, it is not thought
to be particularly reliable (Kunda and Nisbett, 1986).
Other methods social psychologists think we use to predict behavior include generalizing from self (Ross
et al., 1977) and from the situation (Liu et al., 1997). It is also thought that our moods influence the
judgments and hence the predictions we make about other people (Schwarz and Clore, 1996). Some of
these methods, such as attending to the situation, are thought to be under-utilized by humans (Nisbett
and Ross, 1991) whereas others are thought to be unreliable. For example, while there is evidence that
we use ourselves as a model when predicting other people’s behavior, and that we predict that others will
do the sort of thing that we would do, all too often we fail to make the appropriate adjustments between
oneself and another, especially in novel situations. This false consensus bias means that we err by
thinking that others are more like us than they are (Ross et al., 1977).
Though we haven’t yet resolved the question of how humans predict behavior, we do know that the story
isn’t a simple one. We are also learning that Premack and Woodruff’s claim that humans predict behavior
by attributing beliefs and desires to others is an oversimplification. P&V’s Sb+ms is akin to the traditional
philosophical picture of folk psychology which takes novel behaviors to be predicted using theory of mind,
and this leads them to look for chimpanzee theory of mind in instances of prediction. But there is a
tension between understanding theory of mind to have a predictive functional role, and yet thinking that

most prediction is made using behavioral associations. Such a view fails to fully recognize the
explanatory role of theories. Once an explanation for some phenomenon has been generated, the
information we gain can be used when making future predictions. For example, once you come to
understand which beliefs and desires caused a person P to engage in some behavior, you also learn that
P is the kind of person who has those beliefs and desires, and from that you might attribute to P certain
personality traits that can be used to make future predictions.
This isn’t to say that belief and desire attribution, and folk psychology more generally, don’t play an
important role in human social interaction. As Sellars suggests, we may reason about mental states
primarily as a means of understanding our social world (Sellars, 1956). And while P&V may be
sympathetic to a view such as this, they have not taken full advantage of the insight. Rather than offering
a paradigm shift from one predictive experiment to another, the radical shift in the theory of mind research
would be to move away from predictive research paradigms altogether. It is likely that any success in a
predictive paradigm can be explained as the result of a behavioristic psychological system that relies on
behavioral, rather than mental, intervening variables. Thus, as we shall see in the following section,
P&V’s strategy for denying that Hare et al.’s food competition experiment should serve as evidence of
chimpanzee theory of mind can also be used to undermine the false belief task as evidence for the child’s
theory of mind.
5. Povinelli and Vonk’s Critique Also Undermines Children’s Theory of Mind Paradigms
If P&V are going to reject the food competition study as evidence for theory of mind in chimpanzees, then
to be consistent they also ought to reject Wimmer and Perner’s (1983) false belief task as evidence for
children’s theory of mind. While it is true that the performance of chimpanzees in experiments aimed to
demonstrate the existence of a theory of mind can be explained with the Sb model, there is a nonmentalistic story that can be generated to account for children’s performance in false belief tasks as well.
The false belief tasks has long been taken as a litmus test for theory of mind in children (though it has
more recently come under attack e.g. see Bloom and German, 2000). In this paradigm, a child is asked to
make a prediction about where a puppet will look for an object which, during the puppet’s absence, had
been moved to an unexpected location. Children who pass the test say that the puppet will look for the
object where he left it.
While it has been thought that passing the false belief task offers solid evidence that a child has a theory
of mind, P&V could give a non-mentalistic account of the child’s successful answer much in the same way
they explain the chimpanzee’s behavior in the food competition task:
a. Subject observes Maxi putting his chocolate in a box, and then observes Maxi leaving the room.
b. Subject observes Mother coming into the room, and moving the chocolate from the box to the
cupboard.
c. Subject observes Mother leaving the room and Maxi returning.
d. Subject appeals to her database of behavioral generalizations, and finds the matching ‘people
look for objects where they left them’ heuristic.
e. Subject predicts that Maxi will look for his chocolate in the box.
When asked to make a prediction about where Maxi will go to look for his chocolate, the four-year-old
who passes the task could reason about behavioral regularities rather than mental states. The change
from age three to four need not be described as a change in theory of mind status. Instead, it might be
explained by the development of more sophisticated and nuanced representations of behavioral
correlations, or as the overcoming of a bias (Birch and Bloom, 2004). But note that a subject could
successfully use this method even in novel situations. That is, the behavioral regularities that she appeals

to need not be specific to the puppets, to chocolate bars, to going outside, or to any other of the details of
this story. Rather, the regularity that the child refers to might be as simple as ‘people look for things where
they left them’. Since a child might learn this regularity simply by observing her own behavior, rather than
by having observed other people engaging in this behavior, she could make the correct prediction without
ever having observed another searching for an object. I will return to this point in the next section.
Of course there are other reasons why we think that children grasp mental state concepts between the
ages of three and four, and in addition to a plethora of experimental evidence, we know this because
children start speaking of them. Famously, chimpanzees don’t. But since there is a non-mentalistic
explanation for success in the traditional false belief task, P&V enjoy plausible deniability for chimpanzee
theory of mind if and when a chimpanzee passes a non-verbal version of the task. This is not a result to
celebrate, however. If theory of mind is a meaningful scientific notion, there must be some experimental
result that will corroborate its existence.
6. Povinelli and Vonk’s Paradigm Shift
While P&V think that they have developed an experiment that will help to decide the question of
chimpanzee theory of mind, the paradigm shift they suggest will not solve the problem. They propose a
modified version of Cecilia Heyes’ task in order to distinguish between the mentalistic and non-mentalistic
models (Heyes, 1998). P&V’s version is presented as follows:
Subjects would first be exposed to the subjective experience of wearing two buckets
containing visors which look identical from the outside, but one of which is see-through,
the other of which is opaque. The buckets would be of different colors and/or shapes in
order to provide the arbitrary cue to their different experiential qualities. Then, at test,
subjects are given the opportunity to use their begging gesture to request food from one
of two experimenters, one wearing the <seeing> bucket and the other wearing the <not
seeing> bucket . . . By definition, Sb has no information that would lead the subjects to
generate this response. In contrast, a system that first codes the first person mental
experience, and then attributes an analog of this experience to the other agent (in other
words, Sbþms) could have relevant information upon which to base a response (Povinelli
and Vonk, 2004, p. 14).
Despite P&V’s claims to the contrary, this proposed study is an instance of the old paradigm. First, it isn’t
true by definition that Sb has no information about behavioral regularities associated with wearing a
transparent bucket. While P&V think that self-to-other inferences will be inferences about mental states
rather than inferences about behaviors, there is no reason to think so. The subject who successfully begs
toward the experimenter wearing the <seeing> bucket could have, from his own experience, made the
generalization between wearing the see-though bucket and being able to, e.g. walk around without
bumping into things, grab items of interest, etc. Rather than coding first person mental experience, the
chimp could code first-person physical experience. In short, the chimp might make the behavioral
connection between wearing the opaque bucket and not being able to do things. From whom should he
beg? Certainly not the person who isn’t able to do things.
The chimpanzee can reason about the researchers’ behavior from knowledge of his own behavior. I can
give an explanation for the chimpanzee’s successful response to this experiment in a way that parallels
P&V’s explanations of the subordinate’s behavior in the food-competition paradigm:

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

Chimpanzee observes he cannot do things with the <not seeing> bucket on;
Chimpanzee observes he can still do things with the <seeing> bucket on;
Chimpanzee observes Al with the <not seeing> (can’t do things) bucket on;
Chimpanzee observes Penelope with the <seeing> (can do things) bucket on;
Chimpanzee accesses database of behavioral regularities to determine that Al can’t do things
and Penelope can do things;
Chimpanzee gestures to Penelope (because only people who can do things will be able to offer
food).

Though it might be tempting to think that any generalization from one’s own experience to another’s
behavior must necessarily involve knowledge of mental states, I think the following example should
undermine such worries. I can eat a poison berry and get sick from it, while in isolation from everyone
else. From that experience, I could then generalize that the berry will make others sick too, and predict
that they would behave in the same sick way that I did. I can make this prediction without having seen
anyone else get sick from the berry, and without having any notion of a mental state. Experiential
mapping from self to other, contrary to P&V’s claims, need not involve any mentalistic reasoning. Just as
the child who passes the false belief task may be simply generalizing from her own experiences of
looking for hidden objects, a chimpanzee who passes P&V’s proposed task may be merely using the
same non-mentalistic technique.
In response to this critique of their proposed paradigm, Jennifer Vonk has indicated in correspondence
that the chimpanzees’ movements are not constrained while wearing an opaque bucket, and there is no
reason to think that they would learn anything about what they can and cannot do while wearing one. If
this is true, however, there is no reason to suppose that a chimpanzee would prefer to beg from a seeing
trainer rather than a not-seeing trainer. If we suppose the chimpanzee can do everything he has ever
done despite the fact he is wearing the not-seeing bucket, the chimpanzee has no basis for drawing a
connection between being able to see and being able to do things, since he can do everything just fine
while wearing the not-seeing bucket. Thus, even if he had the concept of seeing, the chimpanzee would
have no reason to beg from a trainer wearing a seeing bucket rather than a not-seeing bucket, since he
didn’t make any connection between being able to see and being able to do things (like giving food). If a
chimpanzee could do everything as well with the not-seeing bucket on as he does with the seeing bucket
on, then he would have no reason to infer that a person with the not-seeing bucket on couldn’t give him
food. In this case the chimpanzee’s concept of seeing, if he had one, would be quite different from our
own.
On the other hand, if the chimpanzee cannot do everything he has ever done while wearing the notseeing bucket, my former critique holds. The chimpanzee could make the inference that since he can’t do
things with the not-seeing bucket
on, others wouldn’t be able to do things with the not-seeing bucket on either, and so he won’t beg for food
from someone who is wearing the not-seeing bucket because that person can’t do things. Thus, if either
the chimpanzee can or cannot do things with the not-seeing bucket on its head, the experiment will not
determine between Sb and Sb+ms. Given that P&V’s proposed research paradigm doesn’t help to
adjudicate between mentalist and behaviorist methods of predictions, and that they suspect that much of
human prediction is done without appealing to mental state attributions, I suggest that they look for
evidence in another domain. Explanation, not prediction, may be the most relevant place to look for a
theory of mind, both in humans and chimpanzees.

7. An Explanatory Paradigm
If humans use their theory of mind more for explanation than for prediction, then to test for chimpanzee
theory of mind we might confront chimpanzees with a puzzle whose solution requires having a theory of
mind. Though humans do make many of their predictions by generalizing about behaviors, an explanation
of anomalous behavior cannot be given in terms of behavioral regularities; indeed an explanation is
demanded precisely because the behavior violates expectations. Thus, to test whether chimpanzees
have mental state concepts and whether they use them to make inferences about the behavior of others,
we could design an experiment that places the subject in a situation where he must use what Daniel
Dennett calls the Sherlock Holmes method (Dennett, 1983). Such an experiment would involve setting
cognitive traps for chimpanzees, so that they are given the opportunity to demonstrate their knowledge of
mental states. The trap could involve presenting a subject with an anomalous behavior, and observing his
response.
For example, we might use an explanatory version of P&V’s predictive task. As with their proposed study,
we would first habituate the subject to a bucket with a transparent visor. After this exposure, a
chimpanzee who did have the concept of seeing would come to know that he can still see with the bucket
on his head. If the chimpanzee subject could also generalize the mental state concept from self to other,
he would expect that anyone else who put the bucket on his head would also be able to see. The trap is
to use sleight of hand to switch the <seeing> bucket with one that exactly resembles it visually, but which
doesn’t have a transparent visor. When the first chimpanzee puts the new bucket on his head, the subject
may notice that this chimpanzee is behaving differently from what the subject would expect. We can
observe the subject’s response to his cohort’s presumably anomalous behavior. Here the subject is in a
situation where he has to explain anomalous behavior; in the past chimpanzees with buckets on their
heads behaved normally, and now he is confronted with a chimpanzee who does not. In order to explain
the anomalous behavior, a mentalist chimpanzee subject may wonder whether the anomalous
chimpanzee could see. And, in order to test that hypothesis, the animal could examine the bucket. If the
subject were to do this, it would suggest an attempt to work out a mental explanation for an anomalous
behavior.4
I realize that there are obvious problems associated with interpreting the results of such an experiment,
given that there is no one behavior associated with passing the test. But no explanatory paradigm could
be as methodologically neat as the predictive one, where the subject either makes the correct prediction
or doesn’t. Furthermore, as P&V point out, the neatness of the predictive paradigm may be an illusion, for
two reasons. First, reasoning about mental states does not necessarily entail a different behavioral
response. We have already seen this criticism in the guise of P&V’s belief that humans don’t regularly use
a theory of mind when predicting behavior. Second, and more importantly, ‘there is an implicit assumption
that the humans who design the experiments can use their folk psychology to successfully intuit which
responses can be produced only by reasoning about the underlying mental state’ (Povinelli and Vonk,
2004, p. 4). If a certain amount of interpretation is necessary to analyze the correct response to a
predictive paradigm, the explanatory paradigm cannot be criticized as less objective merely because it
too requires interpretation. The necessity for interpretation is a limitation of all theory of mind studies, on
humans as well as chimpanzees.
P&V should not be surprised that they don’t find the kind of evidence they want in the predictive
experiments; given that they don’t think humans use a sophisticated method such as belief attribution
when making most predictions of behavior, they should have no reason to suspect that chimpanzees
would either. A good place to start looking for chimpanzee theory of mind would be in the same place we
find human theory of mind, and that isn’t typically prediction. I suggest turning attention toward
explanation.

8. Conclusion
I have addressed two concerns with P&V’s (2004) critique. First, it is unlikely that any one purely
predictive paradigm will be able to distinguish between a mentalistic vs. behavioristic explanation for a
subject’s behavior. To test for mentalistic understanding, and to avoid an interpretation of the behavior as
the result of behavioral generalizations, an explanatory task could be developed that might induce
behavior that would be more difficult to explain in terms of behavioral abstraction.
The second concern is that P&V are dangerously close to a reductio ad absurdum, given that their
methods of explaining the chimpanzee performance can be used just as easily to explain the child’s
performance in the false belief task. In working through the gentle controversy, we must be careful to
apply the same standards of evidence to animals that we apply to humans. If passing the false belief task
serves as some evidence that a child has some understanding of other minds, then passing a parallel
task should serve as some evidence in the case of the chimpanzee. We must not ask more of the
chimpanzee than we ask of the child. Taken in isolation, many behaviors can be described as the result
of a non-mentalistic psychological system, and this is true of both humans and other animals. But it isn’t
any one behavior, or success at any one paradigm, that leads us to conclude that humans understand
that others have mental states. It is unfair, and unrealistic, to expect that any one experiment will allow us
to conclude the same about animals.
Though all parties to the debate feel comfortable sidestepping the problem of other minds, and accept
that chimpanzees have beliefs and desires, another problem has taken its place. The new problem of
other minds is not whether the other has a mind, but whether the other knows that we have a mind.
Fortunately, there may be a way out of the problem, and it is the same as the way out of the traditional
problem of other minds: given the current evidence and evidence from future research, we must be willing
to make an inference to the best explanation on the basis of the entire body of evidence. Though a
definitive proof is lacking, that shouldn’t concern us, since most of us are utterly unconcerned about the
lack of a knock-down argument for other human minds.
By refusing to describe the interesting results of the Hare et al. study as evidence for some mentalistic
reasoning, we end up ignoring interesting differences and similarities between species. Chimpanzees
behave as if they have the concept of seeing, and so do most children at the age of four. Domesticated
cats, presumably, do not behave in this way. Where the behaviors are different, the interpretations of
those behaviors will be different. And where they are the same, we ought to see some similarity between
them. The behaviorists got at least that much right.

1

The focus on prediction in the description of the theory of mind psychological system is all the more surprising given Povinelli and
colleagues’ suggestion that an evolutionary function of theory of mind is to explain behavior. Jennifer Vonk kindly directed me to this
work (e.g. Povinelli and Dunphy-Lelii, 2001; Povinelli et al., 2000).
2

In an earlier paper, P&V suggest that a good test for chimpanzee theory of mind would require that chimpanzees engage in a
mental simulation to predict behavior (P&V, 2003). In that paper they describe simulation as ‘using one’s own experiences to model
the experiences of others’ (p. 160). While P&V may think that their proposed paradigm asks chimpanzees to engage in a mental
simulation, there are significant differences between their proposed theory of mind mechanism Sb+ms and traditional versions of
simulation theory. Robert Gordon, for example, would reject P&V’s description of simulation as involving an inference from self to
other (Gordon, 1995). And Alvin Goldman would reject the idea that we can develop a database of statistical regularities without first
engaging in mental simulations (Goldman, 1995). Goldman turns P&V’s structure upside down, since on his view it is the database
of statistical relationships between behaviors and invariants that develop from a theory of mind, rather than the other way around.
This point, however, may be moot given the widespread move toward different hybrid accounts of the

3

Though some might say that trait attribution is simply a shorthand for mental state attributions, I’d like to point to a difference
between the two. A person who is unable to recognize mental states in others may nonetheless be fine dealing within a trait
attribution psychology, and the applied behavioral analysis approach to treating children with autism can include teaching them
something very much like the connection between certain kinds of behaviors and a trait. While someone who has the ability to
interpret mental states would see a natural connection between some specific trait attribution (e.g. being pious) and mental state
attribution (e.g. believing in the existence of God, desiring to avoid God’s wrath, desiring to go to heaven, etc.), that mental state
attribution is not needed to make a prediction so long as one has some understanding of the kinds of behaviors associated with the
trait. A person with autism who knows that pious people usually pray before dinner, but who doesn’t assume that a pious person
believes that God is good, might be able to make the prediction that the pious family will pray. Rather than being shorthand for
mental states, a trait attribution for a person with autism could be shorthand for a class of behaviors.
4

It has been pointed out to me by David Parke and Brian Bridson that the chimpanzee subject may choose to examine the bucket
not in hopes of finding a mentalistic explanation for the anomalous chimpanzee’s behavior, but in order to find a physical
explanation for what is wrong with the bucket. Though this is a possibility, and hence this experiment cannot alone determine that a
chimpanzee has mentalistic understanding, we might find that no one experiment will be sufficient to determine whether a
chimpanzee has mentalistic understanding. Rather than serving as a litmus test for chimpanzee theory of mind, positive success on
an explanatory task such as this one may, along with other experiments and ethological observations, serve to strengthen the body
of evidence in favor of chimpanzee mentalistic understanding. My emphasis on explanatory tasks should be seen as an attempt to
round out the current evidence, rather than as an attempt to replace the current predictive paradigms altogether.
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